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ESOPs and New Product Launch: Conditional Effects of Financial Slack and Ownership 
Concentration 
Abstract 
Basing on risk propensity and cognitive evaluation theory, this study explores the relationship 
between stock options and new product launch. A study based on archival data of 273 group 
affiliated Indian firms for 3 years demonstrates that the rate of new product introduction is a 
function of stock options provided to employees. Furthermore, ownership concentration of 
business groups and financial slack moderate this relationship. 
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1. Introduction 
Launch of new products and services is a critical determinant of organizational performance and 
survival. In view of the importance of new product introduction (NPI) extant literature in the 
field of management has examined the determinants and outcomes of NPI (Cao and Sorescu, 
2013; Olsen et al., 2014). We extend this literature by investigating the impact of stock options 
on NPI under the boundary conditions of business group ownership and financial slack, in the 
context of emerging markets. As business groups are a set of  large firms which, though legally 
independent, are joined together by a constellation of formal and informal ties (Khanna and 
Rivkin (2001, pp. 47–48), empirically we focus on corporate innovation, though our findings 
could benefit even small and medium size enterprises, as new product introduction is significant 
tenet of entrepreneurial activities (Hoskisson et al, 2002).  
Launch of new products is always risky. According to the risk propensity theory (Stewart and 
Roth, 2001), Employee Stock Option Plans (ESOPs) motivate risk averse executives, to take 
risks through ownership in the business and compete more aggressively by introducing new 
products. In the past, scholars have examined the impact of ESOPs on innovation, but only 
through patent filing or R&D activity (Chang et al., 2015; Gamble, 2000; Garrett, 2010 ). 
However, the impact of ESOPs on a firm’s ability to launch new products largely remains 
unexplored. Again, capturing corporate innovation through patent filing is different from 
launching new products in terms of risk propensity. As the outcome of R&D is uncertain, a firm 
may not be able to innovate something new every time. Even innovation does not always imply 
that a firm would use its technology to introduce a new product. This is because the innovation 
for which firm files a patent may not always have the potential to satisfy consumer needs and 
3 
 
demands (Watts and Hamilton, 2013). Thus, often firms out-license their patented technology, if 
they feel they have limited use of the technology. Given that 80 percent of the NPIs fail 
(Castellion and Markham, 2013), executives take much more risk when introducing new 
products to the marketplace, in comparison to the filing of patents. It is because of these 
plausible reasons that scholars have treated NPI as different from innovation, which is generally 
captured through patents or R&D intensity (Kim et al., 2017; Tyler and Caner, 2016). Hence, it 
is critical to explore if ESOPs motivate executives to take substantial risk involved in the 
introduction of new products, despite high chances of failure.  
Exploring ESOPs and NPI relationship is specifically important for emerging market firms 
(EMFs) such as India. Since, the introduction of new products is the primary mechanism through 
which organizations achieve a sustainable competitive advantage, especially in an economy, 
which remained closed for decades, NPI represents a central strategy construct (Smith et al., 
2005). Thus, it becomes imperative to explore the influence of ESOPs on such a central core 
strategy construct. 
We further assert that the impact of ESOPs, as a long-term incentive plan, on an organizational 
outcome such as NPI is likely to be contingent on two factors namely financial slack and 
ownership concentration of families in the business group. We leverage on the cognitive 
evaluation theory (Deci and Ryan, 1985) to explain the contingent effect of financial slack and 
ownership concentration of family members of a business group on the ESOPs and NPI 
relationship.  
Our study contributes to the existing literature on NPI and compensation plan in several ways. 
First, although research on NPI has been conceptualized from the behavioral perspective, such as 
leadership or communication clarity (Sivasubramaniam et al., 2012), the impact of financial 
4 
 
incentives such as ESOPs on the rate of NPI remains unexplored. Broadly, the extant literature 
has explored the compensation and innovation relationship (Tien and Chen, 2013) including 
long-term incentive plans such as ESOPs (Chang et al., 2015; Manso, 2017). The present study, 
however, differs from these studies in several ways. We study NPI and not innovation as 
captured through patents or R&D intensity in extant studies. NPI is a more market seeking and a 
risk prone strategic construct than the relatively less complex patent filing.  Furthermore, most of 
the studies exploring the impact of ESOPs on innovation have leveraged on either the agency or 
behavioral agency theory, which advocates how stock options align the interest of executives 
with those of shareholders (Ederer and Manso, 2013; Sanders and Hambrick, 2007; Freeman, 
2007). The applicability of these theories in emerging markets has been nevertheless 
questionable since principals themselves are major shareholders and instead of the principal-
agent conflict as proposed in agency theory, a principal-principal conflict exists in some of the 
emerging markets (Young et al., 2008). Thus, we leverage on the theory of risk propensity 
(Stewart and Roth, 2001) to explain how ESOPs by giving ownership to executives motivates 
them to take risks and formulate risk aggressive strategy.  
Second, leveraging on the cognitive evaluation theory (Chang et al., 2012) we explain the role of 
financial slack and ownership concentration of firms in influencing autonomy that executives 
have while making risky decisions related to NPI. Though ESOPs could motivate them to take 
risks, however slack and family ownership concentration of business group members could limit 
the autonomy that executives have regarding new product decisions, thus limiting the positive 
impact of ESOP on NPI. The role of concentrated ownership and financial slack on innovation 
has been explored in extant studies (Choi et al., 2011; Mahmood and Mitchell, 2004; Francis, & 
Smith, 1995). Nevertheless, these studies have not explored the ability of concentrated 
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ownership and financial slack to create a boundary condition in influencing the level of 
autonomy executives have in making risk aggressive decisions.  
Finally, studies that have explored the impact of ownership or financial slack on innovation have 
mainly leveraged on corporate governance theories or other organizational level theories such as 
socio-emotional wealth theory or agency theory or resource-based theory (De Falco et al., 2015; 
De Massis et al., 2015; Leyva-de la Hiz et al., 2018;  Naldi et al., 2007), where such constructs 
may not explain how individual-level factors such as job autonomy influences the risk propensity 
and NPI relationship. In addition, although the moderating effect of ownership concentration of 
family members has been explored to some extent (Kraiczy et al., 2015) it has not been explored 
for NPI. We extend the literature on ownership concentration of family firms and financial slack 
in influencing the NPI and compensation plan relationship.   
2. Theoretical background 
2.1. ESOPs and risk taking propensity 
Academic research on the influence of rewards on executive performance is extensive and 
largely drawn from the agency and behavioral agency theories (Gomez-Mejia et al., 2010; 
Pepper and Gore, 2015). However, emerging markets present a unique context, limiting the 
applicability of these theories to explain the risk taking behavior of executives. First, in emerging 
markets, conglomerates in the form of business groups exist, who are the principal shareholders 
and conflicts exist between them and other minority external shareholders (Young et al., 2008). 
A business group is defined as “a collection of legally independent firms that are bounded by 
economic (such as ownership, financial, and commercial) and social (such as family, kinship, 
and friendship) ties” (Yiu et al., 2005, pp. 183-206). These business groups are resource-rich 
corporate parents and provide internal capital markets to affiliated firms, in the absence of well-
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developed external capital markets. However, as they are a form of family firms, conflicts often 
arise between goals and objectives of minority shareholders (i.e. external shareholders) and 
principal shareholders (i.e. family members of the business group). Thus, using agency theory to 
explain the goal congruence of executives with those of principals is difficult, as emerging 
markets have two different principals.  
In the present study, we rely on the risk propensity theory (Stewart and Roth, 2001) to explain 
the influence of ESOPs on NPI. Wright et al (1996) defined risk taking as “the analysis and 
selection of projects that have varying uncertainties associated with their expected outcomes.” 
ESOPs can have a significant positive influence on an executive’s risk taking ability. Stock 
options allow executives to participate in risky projects, with the possibility of upside gains, 
having no limits, while at the same time providing a ceiling from losses. Thus, if a project turns 
out to be successful executives becomes wealthy and if a project fails, executives do not lose 
even if the share prices of the firm fall (Sanders and Hambrick, 2007).  Thus, risk conservative 
executives do not lose from making risky decisions and still get an opportunity to increase their 
personal wealth if the firms’ performance improves. This motivates them to take risky strategies 
such as a new product introduction.  
In a liberalized economy, one of the important parameters for a successful and productive 
enterprise is its ability to introduce new products (). Since introducing new products involve 
managerial risk taking ability, ESOPs can be especially useful in enhancing the rate of new 
product introduction. The long-term payoff structure of stock options incentivizes managers to 
explore both risky opportunities as well as face short-term failures (Chang et al., 2015;Harden et 
al, 2010 ).  Hence, we hypothesize: 
7 
 
Hypothesis 1: Employee stock option plan increases the rate of new product introduction by 
firms. 
 
2.2. Moderating role of ownership concentration of business group 
Family firms, which generally exist as business groups in emerging markets () are less favorable 
towards creative and innovative activities and consequently have lower propensity to introduce 
new products in the market (Duran et al., 2016).  
The socioemotional wealth model (Gomez-Mejia et al., 2010, 2011) states that for family firms’ 
socioemotional wealth is more important. In emerging markets, business groups are family 
owned and hence similar to family firms they face both economic and social pressures to manage 
the business. Post liberalization in the early 1990s, business groups in India required to enhance 
the risk taking propensity of managers, through aggressive strategies such as NPI, to have a 
sustainable economic performance of the business (Kedia et al., 2006). However, as the 
ownership concentration of business groups in a business unit increase due to the emotional 
attachment with the business, they are likely to become risk averse, rather than promoting risk 
taking behavior among executives. This diminishes the autonomy that executives would 
otherwise have in making and implementing risky new product introduction decisions. 
 
Overall, a business group to improve the economic performance of the focal business unit is 
expected to motivate managers for risk taking initiatives such as NPI (Kolev et al., 2017). 
However, as their ownership concentration increases, Business group members out of their own 
risk averseness may discourage the management to invest in risky initiatives, thus inhibiting 
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risky decisions taking autonomy about new product introductions. This could lessen the 
influence of ESOPs on new product development as explained through the cognitive evaluation 
theory. 
The cognitive evaluation theory explains the implications of limited autonomy on ESOPs and 
NPI relationship. The fundamental tenet of cognitive evaluation theory (Boal and 
Cummings, 1981) is that individuals have the need to be self-determining in his/ her decisions. 
Thus, when ESOPs are introduced with the intent of enhancing the risk-taking propensity of 
executives, they themselves decide to invest in risky ventures in the hope of enhancing their 
financial wealth. The theory further proposes that external controls and constraints could crowd 
out individual’s motivation to act in a certain way. This is because external factors could put 
constraints on the autonomy level of executives and they could feel demotivated to act in a 
certain way. In the context of ESOPs, this would imply that when executives experience external 
constraints, i.e. high ownership concentration of family members, they would lose autonomy to 
take risky decisions as motivated by ESOPs and hence would be less interested to respond to 
ESOPs, thus diminishing the impact of ESOPs on NPI.   
Thus, in response to ESOPs, autonomous employees could engage in risk taking initiatives such 
as NPI. However, as ownership concentration of family members increases, they  influence 
executives’ activities and decisions by interfering in their risky strategic decisions on new 
product development. Hence, we hypothesize: 
Hypothesis 2: Ownership concentration of family members of business groups negatively 
moderates the influence of ESOPs on NPI. 
2.3. Moderating role of financial slack  
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Financial slack refers to the amount of liquid resources possessed by a company, which is 
available to managers for use at their discretion (Kim et al., 2008). Penrose (1959) first 
introduced the term “slack” to explain the significance of excess resources for a firm’s growth.  
Scholars have asserted that financial slack is an important catalyst for innovation as it represents 
funds that can be used in the event of uncertainty, i.e. it protects organizations from the failure of 
new product launches. As new product introduction is risky, financial slack provides the much-
required cushion of liquidity to risk averse managers so that R&D can be pursued without any 
risk of failure (Shaikh et al., 2018; Hall and Lerner, 2010 ). 
Extant literature has found a positive influence of slack on innovation (Kim et al., 2008; Nohria 
and Gulati, 1997). Not only direct, but the moderating capability of financial slack is also 
proven, where firms were able to enhance their innovation by using different technology 
sourcing vehicles when the financial slack was high (Lungeanu  et al., 2016). Organizations with 
higher financial slack reported a stronger relationship between environmental responsibility and 
financial performance (Li et al., 2017) and it was also found to influence the rate of acquisitions 
vs divestitures and firms’ aspirational performance relationship (Kuusela  et al., 2017). More 
closely within the innovation literature also, financial slack was found to influence the R&D 
alliances and NPI relationship (Tyler and Caner, 2016).  
We assert that slack resources could also have a moderating effect on new product introduction 
and ESOP relationship. When executives have financial slack available, then, according to the 
cognitive evaluation theory they are not externally constrained by resource scarcity and could 
utilize resources at their discretion to introduce new products in the market. Autonomy due to 
financial slack enhances the executive’s ability to take risks in response to ESOPs. Furthermore, 
financial slack through its ability to provide safety nets promotes managers to pursue new ideas 
10 
 
and projects even if the outcome is uncertain, hence promoting their autonomy in risky decisions, 
in the hope of availing enhanced incentives through ESOPs. Managers are thus able to exercise 
their risk aggressive attitude generated by ESOPs as they don’t have to “firefight” to manage 
resources efficiently, and are free to focus on risky ventures, i.e. facilitating experimentation or 
innovative thinking with potentially high payoffs ). Hence, we hypothesize, 
Hypothesis 3: Presence of financial slack positively moderates the impact of ESOPs on NPI by 
firms.  
 
3. Methodology 
3.1. Sample and data collection 
As business groups are highly prevalent in emerging markets such as India, we selected India as 
the country of study. We selected three fast-growing consumer product industries in India, 
namely: food products, consumer goods and automobiles for NPI related information for a period 
of 2014-2016. These industries were selected, as they were likely to receive more media 
attention due to their fast growth rate (Dai et al., 2017). Additionally, extracting information on 
new products from archival sources would be more comprehensive for the fast-growing 
industries. This resulted in sample of 646 firms. Next, following Elango and Patnaik (2007) we 
restricted our sample size to only those firms that exhibited average sales of at least $1,000,000 
in the given period, i.e. 2014-2016. This was because large-sized firms are likely to attract more 
media attention. The present study focuses only on business group affiliated firms and hence we 
used business group affiliation as a filtering criterion. Finally, we removed firms with incomplete 
financial information, required for this study. After using these filtering criteria, we were left 
with 273 firms. Since we use a three-year period, we had panel data with 273*3 = 819 firm 
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years. Data for this study was collected from multiple secondary online sources, , including 
annual reports of firms, newspapers such as economic times, Times of India, Business Line, 
Business Standard and business magazines of India, such as Business week, Business world, 
outlook business magazine and general google search, where along with company name, and  
key words such as new product, introduction, announce, introduce, offer, roll out, and unveil  
were used. For information on new products, content analysis technique was used as explained 
ahead. Financial information on firms was obtained from Prowess. Prowess is subscription based 
online financial database of Indian companies offered by Centre for Monitoring Indian Economy 
(CMIE). The database provides financial data for over 23,000 firms operating in India. Most of 
the companies covered in the database were also listed on different stock exchanges. 
Furthermore, the financial data include all that information that operating companies require to 
disclose in their annual reports, as per the Indian Companies Act, 1956 (Sharma, 2012) . Overall, 
Prowess database is similar to the Compustat database in the USA.  
 
3.1.1 Model Specification 
The data for the present study was subjected to a fixed-effect poisson regression analysis.  Since 
the dependent variable was a count variable, we could not use OLS regression due to the 
violation of assumptions. Between poisson and negative binomial regression, we used poisson 
regression with cluster-robust standard errors. Poisson regression was chosen as it can deal with 
overdispersion in the data, especially if a fixed effects model is used (Cameron and Trivedi, 
2009; Tyler and Caner, 2015). The Hausman test indicated that we need to subject the data to a 
fixed effect model. To interpret the causal relationship in the regression, independent and control 
variables were lagged by a year.  
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3.2. Measures 
3.2.1 Dependent variable 
Consistent with extant literature (Katila and Ahuja, 2002; Smith et al., 2005), we operationalized 
NPI as the number of new products introduced by the focal firm in India in a given year. To 
collect data on NPI we employed two postgraduate students from a UK University who were 
trained for data collection. Both the students independently searched for NPI information on 
firms in between 2014-2016. Students first scanned online annual reports for all firms. The 
students used several combinations of keywords such as new product, introduction, announce, 
introduce, offer, roll out, unveil, etc. to obtain information on the introduction of new products 
by firms. Students also searched online, newspapers such as economic times, Times of India, 
Business Line, Business Standard and business magazines of India, such as Business week, 
Business world, outlook business magazine and general google search, where along with 
company name, above mentioned key words i.e. new product roll out and unveil were used. This 
was done as there are several online sources which actively captures firms’ activities. Two 
coders also  independently checked every headline and ensured that the content of each article 
was about “new product introduction” For instance, if an article extracted through search for 
“new product” explained improvement in firm performance due to new product, it was not 
considered new product announcement. Furthermore, articles were carefully read and duplicate 
articles were eliminated. Only those NPI information were considered for which both the 
students had an agreement. This entire process first resulted in more than 16,000 articles. After 
filtering results for accurate information on new product lauch and deleting duplicate sources, we 
were left with approximately 3000 articles.  Following Derfus et al. (2008), one of the authors 
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also coded NPI information for 10 percent of the sample firms. Inter-rater reliability was 96.35 
percent, indicating a high accuracy in the coding of articles.  
 
 
3.2.2. Independent variables 
Employee stock option plans (ESOPs): Information on ESOPs was obtained from Prowess. To 
reduce variability and skewness in the data, the natural logarithm of values was used.   
  
Ownership concentration of business groups (OC): Information on the ownership concentration 
of family members of business groups was also obtained from Prowess. It was operationalized as 
the percentage of ownership by family members of a business group. 
Financial slack (FS): Current ratio, i.e. current assets to current liabilities was used as a measure 
of FS (Ashwin et al., 2015; Mahmood and Mitchell, 2004).  
Interaction effect of ESOP and OC: To calculate the interaction effect, we mean centered both 
the variables, i.e. ESOPs and ownership concentration of business groups and then multiplied the 
obtained values from each other. Mean centering was performed to reduce the chances of 
multicollinearity (Shieh, 2010). 
Interaction effect of ESOPs and FS: Similar to the interaction effect of ESOPs and OC, the 
values for ESOPs and FS were mean centered and then multiplied with each other. 
3.2.3 Control variables 
As our dependent variable captured new product introductions, we controlled for those factors 
that could potentially affect new product introduction, as already established in the past 
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literature. R&D intensity is a precursor to new product introduction. Hence, we controlled for 
R&D intensity, which was captured as R&D investment to assets ratio. Similarly, marketing 
expenditure such as preannouncements, etc. could affect new product introduction. Thus, we 
controlled for marketing intensity, captured as marketing expenditure to assets ratio. Large size 
firms are more likely to have resources to introduce new products. Thus, we also controlled for 
firm size, which was captured as the total number of employees. Industry type was also 
controlled using dummy variables with food products as the base category. To reduce skewness 
and variability in the data, we used the natural logarithm of the variable. Finally, we controlled 
for firm’s age as the natural logarithm of the total number of years up to the given year since the 
time of inception of the firm.  
3.3. Effect of endogeneity 
Most research on stock options are vulnerable to the problem of endogeneity (Rajgopal and 
Shevlin, 2002). Following Sanders and Hambrick (2007) we controlled for endogeneity with a 
parameter obtained by regressing stock options in year t on firms’ characteristics in year t-1 and 
year dummies.  The firm characteristics considered were debt to equity ratio and market to book 
value of the firm (Ding and Sun, 2001). Using the regression results, we calculated “predicted” 
level of ESOPs offered by the firm, which was then used as the endogeneity control.  
4. Analysis and Results 
Table 1 provides the descriptive statistics and correlations among the study variables. Table 2 
presents the results of the fixed-effect Poisson regression analysis. Model 1 in Table 2 presents a 
baseline Poisson regression model with only control variables. Model 2 in Table 2 incorporates 
independent variables along with the control variables, while the Model 3 presents the 
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moderators along with the independent variables and the control variables. Figure 1 and 2 
present the interactive plots.   
 
---------------------------------------------------  
Insert Table 1 about here 
--------------------------------------------------- 
 
---------------------------------------------------  
Insert Table 2 about here 
--------------------------------------------------- 
---------------------------------------------------  
Insert Figure 1 about here 
--------------------------------------------------- 
---------------------------------------------------  
Insert Figure 2 about here 
--------------------------------------------------- 
Correlation values between the independent variables in Table 1 were not high, indicating the 
absence of multicollinearity. A VIF analysis was also conducted. VIF values indicated that 
multicollinearity was not an issue, as the values ranged from 1.35 to 6.21, which was below the 
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threshold value of 10 (Kennedy, 1992). A Wald chi-square test indicated that all three models 
were statistically significant (all p<0.001), implying that all the estimated coefficients were not 
simultaneously equal to zero. As can be observed from Model 1 in Table 2, among control 
variables, endogeneity prediction scores, firm’s R&D, and marketing intensity were significant 
predictors of NPI.  
Through hypothesis 1 we speculated that ESOPs are positively associated with NPI. The beta 
coefficient of ESOPs in Model 2 of Table 2 is positive and significant (β=0.18, p<0.01). Hence, 
we received evidence in support of our first hypothesis. Thus, for every additional ESOP given 
by firm, managers launch one additional product (exp 0.18 = 1.19). Given that in extremely 
competitive environment, innovation is source of competitive advantage, each product launched 
can create value for firm. Thus, significance of findings are vital from practical perspective. 
We speculated through the second hypothesis that ownership concentration of business groups 
negatively moderates the impact of ESOPs on the rate of NPI.  The beta coefficient of the 
interaction effect of ESOPs and OC in Model 3 of Table 2 is negative and significant (β=-0.03, 
p<0.01). Thus, we receive evidence in support of our second hypothesis. This beta coefficient 
implies that for a given level of ownership concentration of business group, a firm with one more 
ESOP would launch one more product (exp (0.18-0.03=1.16) than a firm with less ESOP. Thus, 
negative moderating effect of ownership concentration from practical perspective is not much 
significant as firm is still able to launch an additional product. Figure 1 also reveals that NPI 
increases with increase in ESOPs when OC of the business group is low. However, at high OC, 
NPI increases at a slower rate with an increase in ESOPs. However, as reflected by beta 
coefficient this rate is not practically significant, as firm is launching still one additional product 
for an additional ESOP given.  
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Our third hypothesis indicated that financial slack positively moderates the relationship between 
ESOPs and NPI. Since the beta coefficient of the interaction effect of FS and ESOPs was 
positive and significant (β=0.08, p<0.05), we receive evidence in support of the third hypothesis. 
This beta coefficient implies that as financial slack increases by one unit, impact of ESOPs on 
new product launch also increases by one unit, i.e. executives are able to launch one additional 
product (exp (0.18+0.08 = 1.3). Thus, financial slack is able to enhance impact of ESOPs on new 
product launch, though not much significantly different than one. Figure 2 presents a graphical 
view of the FS and ESOPs interaction effect. As can be observed from the graph, for low values 
of FS, NPI increases at a slower rate with an increase in ESOPs, compared to higher values of 
FS.  
It is interesting to see that while interaction effects were statistically significant, their beta  
coefficient were small and in opposite direction. This implies that while financial slack raised the 
impact of ESOPs on new product introduction, at the same time business group ownership 
concentration decreased the impact of ESOPs on new product launch by almost same magnitude 
(β ESOPs*FS = 0.08; β ESOPs*OC=-0.03). However, still overall impact of financial slack on ESOPs 
NPI relationship was higher than ownership concentration; it may imply that ESOPs is likely to 
be effective strategy to enhance NPI by EMFs, when firms have sufficient financial slack. 
Overall, in presence of financial slack, ESOPs are appropriate incentives for employees to 
enhance NPI by firms.  
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5. Discussion and conclusion 
The key objective of this paper was to explore if stock options promote NPI capability of firms, 
especially in emerging markets. NPI is a complex phenomenon which requires a large lock-in 
period right from a product’s ideation to its commercialization (Zhao et al., 2017). Researchers 
have argued that this long gestation period requires executives to remain motivated and 
committed to managing the risky processes involved in the introduction of a new product 
(McKelvie et al., 2011). ESOPs by providing stock ownership motivates risk averse executives 
to take appropriate risk and introduce new products since their benefits are now tightly knitted to 
the financial performance of the company (Graham et al, 2002). Our findings in the context of 
emerging markets support this assertion. We leveraged on the risk propensity theory to explain 
how managers in a risk conservative society such as India, are motivated to take risk. This risk 
taking propensity is reflected in their ability to introduce new products in the market. Thus, as 
ESOPs increased the rate of NPI also increased as stated in Hypothesis 1. 
Extant literature on the impact of compensation on innovation has been largely mixed, with some 
studies claiming the negative influence of variable pay on innovation (Larkin et al., 2012; Pepper 
et al., 2013) while others suggesting a positive influence (Chang et al., 2015; Curran and 
Walsworth, 2014; Ederer and Manso, 2013). Our study extends this line of research by 
examining a very niche area of compensation, i.e. employee stock ownership and its impact on 
NPI. With regard to stock options also our findings are in corroboration with extant studies 
where stock options resulted in more risk taking strategies such as acquisitions (Sanders and 
Hambrick, 2007) or advertising and R&D expenditure (Currim et al., 2012; Wu and Tu, 2007).  
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Furthermore, this relationship between ESOPs and NPI under boundary conditions set up by 
family ownership and financial slack has not been explored earlier, even in developed markets. 
We decided to explore this relationship in the context of emerging markets. This was because the 
global competitive challenges faced by emerging market firms required them to be able to 
compete aggressively through some of the important strategic and risky actions such as NPI 
(Aghion et al., 2005). Leveraging on the cognitive evaluation theory, we find that both financial 
slack as well as ownership concentration of family members moderate the impact of ESOPs on 
NPI such that when financial slack is high, the impact of ESOPs on NPI is high and similarly, 
when ownership concentration of family members is low, the impact of ESOPs on NPI is high. 
Thus, financial slack positively moderates the relationship and ownership concentration of 
family members negatively influences the relationship supporting the third hypothesis. 
 However, our results are needed to be interpreted with caution. As ownership concentration’s 
and financial slacks’ beta coefficient were nearly similar in magnitude and opposite in direction, 
this implies that they are nullifying effect of each other. However, still beta coefficient of 
financial slack was higher, implying that firms with high financial slack may benefit from 
ESOPs in terms of NPI. Furthermore, some control variables such as Marketing intensity, 
explained variation in NPI more than ESOPs as beta coefficient of Marketing was higher than 
beta coefficient of ESOPs. (βMarketing intensity = 0.21, βESOPs=0.161). Rather independent effect of 
financial slack was also higher than ESOPs, (β financial slack=0.18; βESOPs=0.161). This effect can be 
justified as ESOPs is more of motivational incentive tool, where in investment in marketing and 
R&D signals direct usage of firms’ resources. In other words, without primary survey studies, 
extent to which employees felt incentivized with ESOPs for innovation cannot be measured. 
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However, it would not be wrong to deduce that ESOPs does matter for NPI, though magnitude of 
its impact can be justified only through primary studies. 
 In a related study (Kraiczy et al., 2015) family members in TMT were found to negatively 
moderate the impact of CEOs’ risk taking propensity on innovation. Our findings also extend the 
assertions of Chrisman et al’s (2015) study, according to which family ownership can influence 
the willingness of the executives to innovate. While ESOPs can build the ability to innovate, 
however, family ownership decreases both executive’s ability (as they do not have authority to 
make decisions) as well as willingness (they feel demotivated when they lose authority) to 
innovate.  
5.1.Practical Implications 
Our results alert top management about the positive impact that ESOPs have on the rate of NPI. 
Our findings imply that managers in EMFs should be given more ESOPs to make EMFs capable 
enough to compete in a globalized environment. Furthermore, top management needs to ensure 
that sufficient financial slack is available with the firm so that managers can risk resources to 
experiment with new products. In a resource scant environment, where efficiency is more 
important, managers would be unable to take risk, thus demotivating them for investing in new 
product introduction. Also, family firms need to see they do not hold too much shareholding in a 
firm as it would raise their social attachment with the firm and they may become risk averse, thus 
granting less autonomy to managers to invest in risk intensive strategies such as NPI.  
5.2. Limitations and directions for future research 
Our findings are bound by certain limitations which also provide directions for future research. 
First, we conducted our study only with top Bombay Stock Exchange listed firms. As we relied 
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on archival data it was vital to explore only large-sized firms as their annual reports are publicly 
available and important news is captured by the media. In the future, studies can be conducted 
with small-sized firms as well. Second, based on the extant literature we assumed that 
mechanism through which ESOPs positively impact NPI is motivation and risk taking 
propensity. We assert that future studies could benefit if through primary survey-based 
instruments motivation and risk taking propensity can be measured when ESOPs are provided vs 
when ESOPs are not provided. Similarly, although we leveraged on the managerial psychology 
literature to explain the positive impact of high financial slack and low ownership concentration, 
we did not use primary survey instruments to explore the mechanisms through which financial 
slack or ownership concentration impacts ESOPs and NPI relationship. Finally, we explore the 
impact of ESOPs on NPI in only one of the emerging markets. Future studies would benefit if the 
relationship is tested in the context of other countries as well.  
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Table 1: Correlations and Descriptive Statistics (n=819) 
    1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 
1 NPI 1        
2 ESOPs 0.542*** 1       
3 OC -0.23*** 0.125** 1      
4 FS 0.371*** 0.172*** 0.074* 1     
5 R&D Intensity 0.136*** 0.186*** -0.11** 0.092** 1    
6 Marketing Intensity 0.187*** 0.175*** 0.138*** 0.136*** 0.083** 1   
7 Firm Age 0.201*** 0.093** 0.053 0.004 0.072** 0.085** 1  
8 Firm Size 0.148*** 0.151*** 0.021 0.096** 0.161*** 0.247*** 0.253*** 1 
  Mean 4.83 4.94 0.48 1.25 0.009 0.12 3.47 8.83 
  Standard Deviation 7.92 5.68 1.86 0.93 0.06 1.16 1.02 3.57 
***p<0.001, **p<0.01, *p<0.05 
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Table 2: Results of Poisson Regression (n= 819) 
  Model 1 Model 2 Model 3 
ESOPs  
0.161** 
(0.052) 
0.180** 
(0.062) 
OC   
-0.126** 
(0.035) 
-0.13** 
(0.04) 
FS  
0.18*** 
(0.05) 
0.18*** 
(0.05) 
ESOPs*OC   
-0.03** 
(0.01) 
ESOPs*FS   
0.08* 
(0.03) 
Endogeneity 
0.231* 
(0.093) 
0.214* 
(0.083) 
0.225* 
(0.091) 
R&D Intensity 
0.142* 
(0.066) 
0.162* 
(0.075) 
0.165* 
(0.076) 
Marketing Intensity 
0.193** 
(0.071) 
0.211* 
(0.096) 
0.223 
(0.120) 
Firm Age 
0.055 
(0.031) 
0.093 
(0.051) 
0.107 
(0.062) 
Firm Size 
0.072** 
(0.026) 
0.084** 
(0.032) 
0.092* 
(0.041) 
Automobile 0.103 0.112 0.115 
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(0.080) (0.091) (0.102) 
Consumer goods 
0.126 
(0.061) 
0.135 
(0.072) 
0.142 
(0.093) 
Log Likelihood -1119.6 -1088.7 -1079.12 
Wald Chi-Square 53.01 79.82 91.75 
***p<0.001, **p<0.01, *p<0.05; s.e. in parenthesis 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Figure 1: Moderating Effect of OC on NPI and ESOPs Relationship 
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Figure 2: Moderating Effect of Financial Slack on NPI and ESOPs relationship 
 
 
 
 
